The concept of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) has enjoyed immense popularity and thus has been the preferred approach for river basin management. IWRM generally has a strong focus on rational choice, based on a technocratic conceptual interpretation of the conventional hydrological cycle. However, uncritical acceptance of IWRM runs the risk of blinding policy makers and academics for the defining impact of context, socio-cultural, political, historical and cognitive dimensions in water cooperation. Human behaviour in water cooperation was tested and observed during eight experiments with the Jordan River Basin Boardgame Exercise (JRBBE) played with respondent groups from inside and outside the Jordan River Basin. The experiments consisted of one control group outside the basin and seven respondent groups both outside and inside the basin. This article argues that the role of identities, beliefs and perceptionof-the-other, should be taken more into account in order to develop successful and socio-political sustainable river basin management.
Introduction
This article is written within the framework of the Lund University project on "Hydropolitics in the Jordan River Basin" funded by the Swedish Research Council and aims to analyse and observe human behaviour in water cooperation using a simulation experiment called the Jordan River Basin Boardgame Exercise (JRBBE). The hypothesis of this study is that the behaviour of players of the JRBBE will be strongly influenced by their identity, beliefs, empathy, perception-of-the-other and cognitive-emotive history and these factors play a defining role in decision-making processes on water management. It is argued that players from outside the Jordan River Basin will play the JRBBE in a significantly different manner than players from inside the basin.
The core methodology for this paper consists of the use of experiments of serious gaming, besides a mixed method of semi-structured interviews with groups and individual respondents, a review of the literature, secondary data and video recordings. Serious gaming is an interdisciplinary methodology and can be found in the fields of development studies, political sciences and humanities and the arts, such as on-line media, transmedia and participatory cultures (Lankford et al. 2004 , Lankford and Watson 2007 , Flanagan 2009 . Besides experiments in a classroom environment, the author undertook several fieldtrips to play the JRBBE in situ between September 2011 and June 2013.
In the first part of this article, as a theoretical background of this study, a literature review and the geographical area of the Jordan River Basin are described. In the second part, a description of the JRBBE is given, followed by an overview of the experimental sessions that have taken place with the game. Finally, this article concludes with a discussion on the role and importance of identity, empathy and perception in decision-making of transboundary water management and a policy assessment on the feasibility of hydro-peacebuilding in the Jordan River Basin.
and groundwater resources such as river basins and aquifers (Mukhtarov and Cherp 2014) . The official definition of IWRM according to the Global Water Partnership (GWP) is as follows: "a process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems." 1 However despite the immense popularity with policy makers, academics and international development agencies, there is little concensus on what IWRM actually constitutes and how it should be implemented (Biswas 2008 , Mukhtarov and Cherp 2014 , Squires et al. 2014 . IWRM is based on the paradigm of the classical hydrological cycle where the actions of people are regarded as anthropogenic disturbances. In their extensive study on the status of the Earth's water balance, Vörösmarty and Sahagian (2000) argue that anthropogenic disturbances in the form of human activities (e.g. aquifer depletion, wetland drainage) have had a significantly detrimental effect on the global hydrological cycle. IWRM is aimed at managing the hydrological cycle and restoring the balance: in other words to stop human beings from acting as destructive anthropogenic disturbances and instead transform human presence into a positive and constructive factor, beneficial to the global hydrological cycle. However, sustainable management of a river basin or watershed is an often stated but difficult to define objective, and people and place are major determinants of success (Squires et al. 2014) . Moreover, instead of being objective units of anthropogenic disturbances in a model, people are socio-political beings with identities, feelings and cognitive-emotional experiences, having beliefs and perceptions of others that are subject to change.
Integrated water resources management is presented as one of the most efficient, equitable and sustainable approaches for water, management in coping with increasing demands for water including river basin management (RBM) as a subset (Mukhtarov and Cherp 2014) . There is little empirical proof of actual widespread effectiveness on the ground, yet IWRM is still the dominating discourse in water policy circles (Mollinga 2008, Mukhtarov and Cherp 2014) . The basis for the popularity of IWRM for policymakers, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations organizations can be found in the notion and strong belief that water problems can be solved by technology, either existing or to be discovered in the future, without having to factor in human relations and inequitable political arrangements. International actors that actively promote IWRM are the International Network of Basin Organizations (INBO), the Global Water Partnership (GWP), the World Water Council (WWC), the Arab Water Council (AWC) and the UNDP initiative of capacity building (CAP-Net) who set the norms for good water governance (Mukhtarov and Cherp 2014) .
Technocracy, blueprinting, managerialism and rational choice theory dominate in the paradigm of IWRM which involves analytical capabilities, modelling, calculation and evaluation in terms of reason and rationality, the latter being a central concept in branches of economics such as collective action theory, where agents' preferences are taken to be rational and people will make reasonable choices based on maximization of economic and social welfare (Uphoff 1992 , Hausman 2013 , Maurel et al. 2014 .
The main critique is that IWRM remains largely in the realm of being a conceptual technocratic model that is quite difficult to implement, whilst at the same time being deeply dependent on local political and cultural contexts (Abraham and Platteau 2004, Maurel et al. 2014) . Parallel academic discourses that are critical towards rational choice paradigms can be distinguished in two different fields of study: in peace and conflict studies, there is an increasing body of critical peace studies, developed critiques on rational choice and institutional blueprinting of peacebuilding and interventionism (Chandler 2005 , Rittberger and Fischer 2008 , Richmond 2008 , Aggestam 2009 ), whilst in the irrigation field, rational choice and institutional blueprinting of water management, in the form of IWRM, have been heavily scrutinized for flaws specifically with regard to the lack of context, disregard of power, the temporal, the local and the political (Uphoff 1992 , Boelens and Hoogendam 2002 , Abraham and Platteau 2004 , Adhikari and Lovett 2006 . The common denominator between the two fields is the critique towards rational choice, managerialism, institutional blueprinting and technocracy. As alternatives to blueprinting and rational choice, more psychosocial, feminist, post-colonial, postmodern theories and complex theories of human ecological systems, political ecology, people-to-people peace, the everyday and the local, power dimensions, identity, recognition and conflict transformation, have emerged. Neo-Gramscian thinkers on river basin management and hydropolitics. Such as Jan Selby (2003 Selby ( , 2005 Selby ( , 2013 , Mollinga (2008) and Mark Zeitoun (2006 .
Include politics and power and emphasize the notions of hydro-hegemony and counter-hegemony that are rooted in institutions of civil society and government at river basin level.
However, the studies mentioned above, offer little to nothing in terms of empirical data on the role of identity, beliefs, empathy, perception-of-the-other and cognitiveemotive history in decision making on water cooperation. By contrast, in the field of cognitive theory, studies on natural resources conflict or structural violence focus on the role of identity, trust, empathy, emotion and perception-of-the-other as essential elements in the success of resolving conflicts (Uphoff 1992 , Gorsevski 1999 , Svedberg 2000 . When inflicted violence results in an emotional trauma that is not processed, recognized or reconciled, this open wound will come back in future negotiations between adversaries, leading to a consequent asymmetrical communication and unending power struggle between them which can lead to structural hegemonic domination and a return to violence. Therefore recognizing each others' grief and trauma is important to build trust, empathy for the other and eventually a feeling of peace between parties (Gorsevski 1999) . Borrowing from cognitive theory, the following section reflects on the role of identity, beliefs, empathy, perception-of-theother and cognitive-emotive history in water cooperation and environmental peacebuilding.
3 The role of identity and empathy in water cooperation and conflict
In her case study of environmental peacebuilding and the "Good Water Neighbours Project" carried out between Israel, Palestine and Jordan by the regional NGO Friends of the Earth Middle East (FoEME), Harari (2008) concludes that trust, recognition and a shared set of norms and values, a shared identity, are important prerequisites for successful environmental peacebuilding (Harari 2008) . People empathize more with other people when they have some shared identity. Environmental peacebuilding assumes that when norms and values on altruism, pro-social behaviour and sustainability transcend selfishness and strategic interests of the individual riparians, the environment can be used as a linking element and means to foster cooperation and empathy. Environmental peacebuilding envisages bringing together parties in a conflict to cooperate on environmental issues and generate common solutions for shared environmental problems (Conca and Dabelko 2002, Harari 2008) . The aim is to arrive at a situation where violence is absent and eventually, in the long term, where the idea of violence between previous adversaries becomes unimaginable (Harari 2008) . Harari (2008) makes the distinction between environmental conflict resolution, where scarcity or abundance of natural resources are the cause of conflict and environmental peacebuilding, when the cause of conflict is other than the environment. In both cases, however, the aim is to manage the environment and natural resources together to build and strengthen a shared identity between two conflicting parties. Indicating social learning processes, Harari (2008) considers a shared collective identity as crucial to the success of environmental peacebuilding. Still, this begs the questions, What role does identity play in both conflict and cooperation, and How is a shared identity constructed in order to foster empathy amongst conflicting parties? This shared collective identity is created based on the cooperation and mutual experience that conflicting parties will develop by working together on environmental issues and natural resource management, by means of which the parties will develop stronger empathy for each other. In fact this seems a "Catch-22" situation (see Fig. 1 ).
The main challenge is how to get conflicting coriparians to cooperate, when unrecognized and Figure 1 . The process of creating a shared identity through environmental peacebuilding.
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unresolved open wounds of inflicted traumas between them remain unresolved and, instead of an empathic connection, their relationship is characterized by hostility and violence. The first step should be in the form of some kind of transitional justice and recognition in wrongdoings in the violent relationship.
To shed some more light on identity theory in this section, I would like to highlight the concepts of fluid identities and core construct, borrowing from literature of social psychology and political psychology (Strömbom 2010) . Assuming that collective and shared identities are constructed, rather that inherited by birth, human identities are never static nor homogenous, therefore most personal identities are subject to change through processes of cognition and perception in relation to and communication with other human beings (Turner 1999 , Strömbom 2010 ). Strömbom describes how psychologist George Kelly developed the notion of core construct meaning a central identity construct of a person that is less susceptible to change; if this core identity construct of an individual, an ego, feels threatened in any form by perception-of-the-other as an enemy, this ego could start feeling insecure and the individual even become violently defensive (Shotter 2007 , Strömbom 2010 ). In the case of a negative and fearful perception-of-the-other, a perceived existential threat to the core construct can lead to a violent outbreak between two or more people. Conflict transformation is a process whereby the negative and fearful perception-of-the-other is converted into a positive and trusting perception-of-the-other. If that process has taken place, people are able cooperate successfully and constructively. It begs the question to what extent identities belong to core constructs leading to rigidity and inflexibility and, in the worst cases, violence, and which identity constructs belong to the fluid changeable identities with the potential to create some degree of shared regional identity around a common water source? It is assumed that identity constructs such as family, nationality, ethnicity and religious identities are much less fluid than educational, ideological and professional identities. Kalpakian (2004) , who has undertaken extensive case studies on water, conflict and identity in the Nile, Tigris and Indus river basins, concludes that water does not cause violent conflict but it is identity that shapes people's attitudes and creates the others. Kalpakian challenges the assumption that water itself is the cause of conflict, concluding that identity plays a primary role in causing conflicts over water. In his assessment of international water disputes, Wolf (2006) argues as well that water never is the single and hardly ever the major cause of conflict because nations cannot afford to fight over it and instead water fuels greater interdependence globally (Wolf 2006) . Wolf (2006) found that the rate of cooperation is a lot higher than the occurence of acute conflict; however, of all of the 37 violent water conflicts recorded in the past 50 years, 30 took place between Israel and one of its neighbours (Wolf 2006) . Kalpakian (2004) showed with his case studies that issues related to identity have been the real source of conflict in most river basins. Kalpakian (2004) also removes the state as sole actor in violent water conflict and differentiates between state and non-state actors in water cooperation and conflict. This aspect is important as non-state actors like regional NGOs, such as Friends of the Earth Middle East (FoEME), could serve as catalysts for cooperation (FoEME 2012). As Israeli and Palestinian water professionals and academics Tal and Abed Rabbo (2010) have shown with their impressive work to prepare the ground for cooperative and sustainable water management in the basin with their book Water Wisdom, a wide body of non-state actors in academia across national borders in the region share a cosmopolitan and highly knowledgeable educated identity that transcends nationality, ethnicity and religion.
Conflicts related to identity issues are often based on a deep mistrust and fear of the other. In a neo-Gramscian context, the dominating hydro-hegemon in a river basin feels better than the other and this is reflected in domination, a lack of empathy for the other and an asymmetrical power relationship, as well as the hegemon's dominating attitude in communication and a certain disregard for the other, less powerful, riparians. In other words, a hegemon constructs its enemies to justify its domination, often reflected in structural violence, and perceives these enemies as subaltern and violent not trusting the other riparian. In turn, the sub-alterned riparian partner, or enemy in the hegemon's perception, develops a deep mistrust and resistance against the domination of the hegemon in the form of counter-hegemony and counter-violence. The importance of trust and recognition can therefore not be emphasized enough as the most important prerequisite for successful water cooperation on an equal basis without power asymmetries. Conca and Dabelko (2002) highlight that a common environmental threat can lead to positive action between riparians which in turn builds up mutual trust, empathy and common identities (Conca and Dabelko 2002, Harari 2008) . According to Conca and Dabelko (2002) , the 'stick', in the form of an environmental threat or impeding harm, tends to work better than the 'carrot', in the form of mutual interest, as common interests may lead to competitive behaviour. Common environmental management will help in fostering mutual dialogue, which is a first step in reconciliation (Conca and Dabelko 2002) . In her assessment of environmental cooperation, Harari (2008) states that a successful process should be able to make a cognitive connection between adversaries. Environmental peacebuilding then creates solutions for shared environmental problems, fostering a joint language and creating a shared identity.
Once a regional identity is established, adversaries tend to display more ecological altruism and empathy. The measurement for a successful process of river basin cooperation is thus indicated by the level of trust and empathy and the existence of a shared and regional identity. However, one key factor undermining the building of trust and empathy between riparians in a river basin is the presence and domination of a hydro-hegemon with disproportionate power over the control of the water resources and over other riparians, both militarily and politically. Domination of a hydro-hegemon, using military means to suppress other riparians, consolidates the presence of structural violence and starts a cycle of violence that repeatedly inflicts trauma. A prerequisite to start building trust between adversary co-riparians is thus to stop any kind of violence between them and recognize the inflicted traumas; in other words, conflicting co-riparians begin to perceive each other as equal partners. This is a longterm process and does not happen overnight.
The work on environmental peacebuilding and the ideal of creating a shared identity that transcends and unites riparians at basin level is important. However, environmental peacebuilding also risks falling into the same depoliticizing trap as IWRM. With the focus on managerialism and, technocracy and at the same time an underestimation of the role of politics and power, there is a perceived gap between the ideal expectations of the blueprint, and the realities and practicalities on the ground that inhibit the successful implementation of a concept like environmental peacebuilding. In this regard the work on hydrohegemony by Zeitoun (2006) is quite relevant. Zeitoun (2006) contributed to studies on power and hydrohegemony based on research in the Nile, Tigris/Euphrates and Jordan river basins, leading to the conclusion that, in each case, power asymmetries influenced an inequitable outcome. Anders Jägerskog (2003b) uses the prism of regime theory to look at water cooperation in the Jordan River Basin and deals exclusively with the Lower Jordan River states of Israel, Palestine and Jordan. He concludes that the Jordan River Basin is a hegemonic structure where Israel is dominating, and donors and international agencies can play a crucial role in the development of water cooperation, but warns that it takes a long time and perseverance, not just an agreement. Jägerskog also warns that, although external agents should stimulate collective action between riparians, they should stop short of imposing it (Jägerskog 2003a (Jägerskog , 2003b ). An elaborate assessment by Jon Martin Trondalen (2008) covers Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria and Turkey, and sheds more light on possible solutions to water disputes in the Middle East. Selby (2003 Selby ( , 2005 Selby ( , 2013 , however, indicated that both on theoretical and empirical grounds, the political framing of cooperation on water management between the Israelis and Palestinians led to more domination and colonization. Donor aid and external agency in fact have facilitated and exacerbated the hydro-hegemony of Israel in the basin. Selby coined the phrase "domination dressed up as cooperation". Finally, Zeitoun's latest work, gives an overview of the hydropolitical baseline of the Upper Jordan River concluding that extreme asymmetry and inequity has been achieved and maintained in the Jordan River Basin leading to a detrimental state of the entire basin (Zeitoun et al. 2012) . Dombrowski (1998) describes that major water development schemes have been a source of conflict between Israel on one side and Arab states on the other, and four Arab-Israeli wars have historically shaped the hydrostrategical positions of the riparian states. Eighteen years ago, Dombrowsky stated that, due to hydrological and socio-demographic conditions, water resources management is extremely challenging in the Jordan River Basin and will be even more so in the future (Dombrowski 1998) . The geographical context of the Jordan River Basin is further described in the next section.
Geographical research context
The Jordan River is a 250-km-long meandering river that flows southwards through Israel, Jordan and the occupied Palestinian Westbank, originating from three rivers that rise in the Lebanese mountains and Syrian and Jordanian plains towards the Dead Sea where it has the lowest elevation in the world (400 m b.s.l.). Its principal tributaries are the Hasbani, Banias, Yarmouk and Dan rivers, which rise respectively in Lebanon and Syria all feeding into its main open water reservoir, the Sea of Galilee, also known as Lake Tiberias (Libiszewski 1995 ) (see Fig. 2 ).
The Jordan River has an average flow of approximately 1400 × 10 6 m 3 per year and is a closed basin that is shared by five different riparian countries; Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine and Israel (Passia 2002 , Jägerskog 2003b , Zeitoun 2008 . The demise of the Jordan River since the 1960s has been rapid; many parts have almost no flow anymore. According to FoEME (2011), 97% of the river's original flow of approx. 1258 × 10 6 m 3 is diverted by Israel, Syria and Jordan before it reaches the Dead Sea. The remaining flow is polluted due to uncontrolled industrial and agricultural activity and the river has lost over 50% of its original biodiversity (FoEME 2010 (FoEME , 2011 (FoEME , 2012 . The Dead Sea is sinking at a rate of at least one metre per year, but better regional cooperation could help reverse its decline (Brown and Crawford 2009 , FoEME 2010 . Apart from the unresolved peace agreements between Israel and its neighbours where the water is not addressed, there are hydropolitical tensions between Jordan and Syria, potential tensions between Syria and Lebanon and between Jordan and Palestine (Aggestam and Sundell-Eklund 2012) .
The on-going hostilities between the riparian states have prevented the establishment of an effective River Basin Organization (RBO) for water governance. The only regional governance initiative that is in place in the Lower Jordan Valley is between Israel, Palestine 2 and Jordan, as well as a non-state initiative such as the FoEME Jordan Valley project, in the same states. The water cooperation between Israel and Palestine (the interim agreement in the Oslo Agreements) has been heavily criticized as a hegemonic relationship between an occupying state and occupied territories. The 1994 peace treaty between Jordan and Israel covers a bilateral water agreement. There is no transnational governance initiative which includes all the five co-riparian countries: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine and Israel. For long-term river basin management, a fully developed regional initiative in the form of an RBO should include Lebanon and Syria. Assaf (2000) emphasizes the continuous efforts by Palestine towards widening regional cooperation in the water sector as a fundamental action to sustainable peace and stability in the region. Amery and Wolf (2000) conclude that, although there are difficulties in truly achieving sustainable water management of the Jordan River, a water peace at basin level can be but a glimmer of hope on the long-term horizon.
The Jordan River Basin Boardgame Exercise (JRBBE)
"this game is real. it is so close to what we all experience here in the basin"
Player from Jordan
The socio-political history of the Jordan River Basin was used to contextualize a Jordan River Basin Boardgame Exercise (JRBBE), developed and facilitated by the author and the project team for the Lund University project on Hydropolitics in the Jordan River Basin. The game serves as a simplified metaphor for the Jordan River Basin and a methodological tool to observe human behaviour in decision-making processes of water cooperation. River basin boardgames distil the main dimensions of ecological and human processes in a conceptual hydrological model (Lankford and Watson 2007, Magombeyi et al. 2008) . Bruce Lankford (Lankford and Watson 2007) has contributed greatly to natural resource gaming with his River Basin Game as a dialogue tool for decision makers and water users of surface water resources. He attributes the success of his River Basin Game (Lankford and Watson 2007) of solving a "real-life" problem through game experimentation to its quality of metaphor; it can explore future scenarios from participants' choices. Lankford's game is a large wooden board placed on a slope with a catchment at the top and a wetland at the bottom. The facilitator throws marbles in a flow down, simulating surface water runoff. The JRBBE is different in its design and set-up; it consists of a flat boardgame where blue marbles, representing freshwater resources in the Jordan River Basin, are transferred between five players, representing co-riparians. The blue marbles simulate water-flows of both groundwater and surface water in the basin's hydrological cycle. The game is a cooperative management game.
The five players (or player groups) of the JRBBE start by listening to a game facilitator explaining their task as players:
"The famous River Jordan is about to die. There is a growing demand for water from the river, lakes and the groundwater. The level in the famous Sea of Galilee will reach the dreaded black line, fishing will be impossible, people will die of thirst and the Dead Sea will be dry and beyond repair which means environmental suicide is impending for the whole basin. You and your fellow players are each leaders of the countries Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine and Israel that share this river basin. Your task is to save the River Jordan and the Dead Sea and at the same time give your people enough to drink. But political, social and climatic events hamper your goal. Can you manage the basin together?"
The five players represent the five co-riparian states in the Jordan River Basin. Before the start of the game, each player gets a certain number of blue marbles in the following order: Palestine (14), Lebanon (11), Syria (32), Jordan (22) and Israel (21). The start allocation of the first 100 marbles amongst the five players, represents an optimal allocation of water resources in the basin in percentages based on a mathematical model developed by Mimi and Sawalhi (2003) . In 2003, Mimi and Sawalhi warned that unless co-riparian states of the Jordan River Basin cooperate and jointly manage their water resources, they all stand to lose in terms of long-term viability of their water systems (Mimi and Sawalhi 2003) . They developed a methodology to calculate the optimal allocation of the Jordan River Basin waters in percentages, based on nine equity factors from which they derived equity standards: geography, hydrology, climate, utilization, economic and social needs, population, comparative costs of alternatives, availability of other resources and appreciable harm. River Basin Bank with a collection of marbles in stock, representing freshwater (blue), reused water (green) and new water (coloured) to be used and distributed during the game. The facilitator also holds a set of three stacks of cards: Event cards, Solution cards and Dialogue and Mediation cards. The 30 Event cards describe conceptual events based on real events that happened in the Jordan River Basin. This could be a military event (war), internal political event (elections), a natural event (snow), an environmental event (pollution) or a socio-economic event (uprising). The events are not in a particular chronological order except for the first event: the Arab-Israeli War in 1948. The other Event cards in the stack have no date. When drawn, the players should follow the instructions on the card. The occurrence of an event during the turn of the player, results in a change in distribution of the blue marbles. For example the text on the card about the event of a war between Israel and Syria reads like this:
"A war erupts between Israel and Syria. Israel wants to improve its hydrostrategic position in the region. The Israeli Army pushes the Syrians from the Sea of Galilee and occupies the Syrian Golan Heights. Israel starts building a big canal called the National Water Carrier so it can provide water for its coastal cities and irrigated agriculture in the Negev Desert. Israel and Syria are now in a state of war. Israel receives 5 blue marbles from Syria and puts a Big Canal piece on the board. Israel and Syria cannot negotiate with each other until one of the two players draws a 'dialogue & mediation' card."
Each player has a dice and the players take turns throwing the dice. The first player who throws number six can start the game and draws an Event card. The first event of the game is always the first ArabIsraeli war: "It's 1948, Israel has just declared itself as a State, following the removal of Palestinian people from its land. The surrounding riparians attack Israel. The result is a massive battle. The Arab countries are now officially in a state of war with Israel. Israel cannot start a dialogue with any of its neighbours until a mediation card is drawn."
After this event card sets off the start of the boardgame the turns for each player go clockwise. The number that the player throws with the dice corresponds to the following actions through which players either lose or win marbles: Throughout the game, events that happen in the basin will affect and upset the allocation and distribution of marbles amongst the five players. The goal of the game is to arrive back at the amount of marbles that each player received at the beginning of the game. This optimal allocation is a metaphor for a situation of sustainable river basin management where all co-riparians have enough water to satisfy their needs. To gain true water security and satisfy their demands, the co-riparians should thus collaborate in water resources (see also Phillips et al. 2005 ).
An important interactive element for the progress of the game, is that the players can start a water dialogue when drawing a Dialogue & Mediation card. With this card, a state of war between two co-riparians can be lifted and water dialogues can start. If there is no state of war between co-riparians, this card gives the players various options to share marbles peacefully, or start a military strike to gain marbles from co-riparians. The choice is theirs: to negotiate with peaceful dialogue or use violence to gain marbles by force. Starting a war for water with another co-riparian gives two marbles immediately, but, because the players are then in a state of war, the player is not able to negotiate until another Mediation card is drawn again. On the basis of consensus, the group has a one-off option for complete basin dialogue whereby all states of war are lifted and marbles can be shared peacefully among each other.
Each player has a measuring card with a black and a blue side. When players reach their start number of marbles (= optimal allocation), they put the blue side up on the board. If the players have only two marbles left, they should turn the card to black. If neither of these circumstances occurs, the player removes the card from the board and continues playing. If all players have black sides on the board, the game is over. This situation symbolizes environmental suicide. If all players have a blue side on the board, i.e. have returned to their initial number of 'freshwater' blue marbles, the game is won, meaning a blue peace. It is important to emphasize that the JRBBE is about a group win not an individual win; if only one player collects most of the marbles, the game is lost.
Results
This section gives an overview of the outcomes of various experimental sessions with the JRBBE. The game was tested with a control group in a pilot session and subsequently introduced to the fieldwork area. The various feedback sessions and group interviews with participants after the game sessions are most important; first of all, it gives the opportunity for the researcher to interview the players about their feelings and reflections on the game and, secondly, feedback sessions were used to collect suggestions on how to improve the design of the game.
The pilot try-out was performed with a control group at the Sixth World Water Forum in Marseille, France, in 2012, 4 to test the boardgame and conduct interviews with the players afterwards. The participants of this control group were highly-educated water professionals from outside the region, from South East Asia, Africa and Latin America, with neither personal nor professional relationship with the basin. Their core and fluid identities were not created nor constructed with reference to the Jordan River Basin. During that try-out session, the players did not express any animosity towards each other and consequently won the game quite fast, as they were very keen to share marbles with each other and not use any violence or wars to gain marbles from other co-riparians. Their experience and perception-of-the-other did not form a psychological barrier for cooperation, which seems to be in concordance with the hypothesis of this article that identity issues inhibit cooperation. The overall game was played with a high degree of ecological altruism and empathy towards each other, and resulted quickly in an overall win. Figure 3 shows, in chronological order, the end results of other game sessions that were played with participants from both outside and inside the basin who had some degree of identity relationship towards the basin.
A total of 61 participants played the game during the study period, with an average duration of 2.5 hours for each game session. The number of blue marbles at the end of the each game session for each respective player group (Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan) is plotted on the y-axis (Fig. 3) . The game sessions numbered one to seven, are plotted on the x-axis with a win situation of optimal allocation representing the control group on the far-right. None of the groups in fact reached the end result of environmental suicide. The main reason for this is that during the process of the game, regional rains provided extra marbles in the system and empathic altruists in the group managed to convince other players to share their freshwater marbles with others. This altruism prevented the groups from reaching the state of environmental suicide. The outcomes of the experiments show that, although it is easy for a team to win by agreements that produce an optimal allocation, only some teams actually did this and it did not mean a win in all sessions. Groups 2 and 6 had a clear win situation reaching over and above the optimal allocation at the end of the game. Groups 4 and 5 ended up in a non-win situation, although less ambiguous than groups 1 and 3, who ended up in a much clearer nonwin, and Group 7 who had a clear hegemonic non-win end result. Looking at Fig. 3 , a game can end with water abundance in total but still result in a loss for the overall team due to the inequitable and thus non-optimal allocation of marbles; it is a hegemonic outcome of inequitable water abundance. This can happen when one or more players play selfishly and there is enough supply of rainfall, so that a great number of blue marbles circulate in the game. Below is a short description of each respective game session ranked from a clear win to a clear losing of the game, in order of how close the groups are to an ideal win of optimal allocation.
A clear win: groups 2 and 6
Groups 2 (Syrians) and 6 (Palestinians) resulted in a clear win. Most of the players realized that the goal of the game was to cooperate and, throughout the game, some altruistic players were able to convince others to share marbles for the benefit of the basin as a whole. As a consequence, these game sessions did not result in hydro-hegemony. Session 2 took place in the occupied Golan Heights with Syrian villagers, mainly ethnic Druze, a small minority with strong cultural and social links to similar communities in Lebanon, Syria and Israel, which explains partly why they would have the cross-border empathy needed to win the game. The outcome was positive and resulted in a win situation. Throughout the game, much focus was on Palestine as a co-riparian. The group also pointed out that the Syrian uprising should be part of the event cards. The Lebanon player made a conscious choice to consequently not lift any state of war with Israel. Empathy with Palestine was expressed by giving blue marbles and, finally, the decision of Lebanon to give blue marbles to Jordan, after being convinced by Syria, resulted in winning the game. In their feedback, the players clearly indicated that personal feelings and past experience determined how they made decisions and why they cooperated or did not cooperate with other players. Session 6 took place in Ramallah, Palestine with various staff of the Negotiations Affairs Department (NAD) of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and academics and practitioners of the Palestinian Water sector. The professionals were aware that their water security depends on regional stability and equity. The game resulted in a win. Throughout the game in Group Session 6, the Israel player refused to give marbles to Palestine, and Jordan kept suggesting to make use of regional mediation, which was also refused. After a couple of rounds where Palestine and Jordan were losing a lot of marbles, the Jordan player managed to convince the group to empathize and agree to a one-off regional dialogue and mediation. This resulted in a win situation. In general, the players enjoyed the game and found that it reflected the real situation on the ground. In reality, none of the current co-riparians, according to a player from Group 6, takes the basin interest seriously. Both groups suggested using the JRBBE as a future scenario development tool to create a sustainable vision on transboundary water management in the Jordan River Basin.
A near-win end situation: groups 4 and 5
Session 4 took place at Birzeit University, Palestine, with students of the Department of Water Engineering. The group was unfamiliar with hydropolitics on the basin level but had a background in water engineering in Palestine. The game resulted in a hegemonic position for Israel, whose role was played by a Palestinian student. It took until almost the end of the game before someone offered to play more altruistically. Then the group started to win the game, but by that time it was too late. It was a near win. The empathy of the Israel player was triggered at the moment that the Palestine player lost all but two of its marbles, which turned the tide of the game. Session 5 took place in Tel Aviv with young Jewish Israeli progressives and an exchange student from Tel Aviv University; it resulted in a hegemonic position of Israel. Throughout the Group 5 game, Palestine lost many marbles. Before the end of the game, empathic altruists in the group persuaded Israel to give seven marbles to Palestine on the condition of granting full access for Israel to the Jewish Holy sites. This move reduced the asymmetry in the final outcome, which was still hegemonic. The participants of this group were Englishspeaking American and Australian new Jewish immigrants to Israel, so-called Oleh Chadash.
5 They found the game entertaining and, whilst playing, they felt it was more tempting to start a war than act altruistically towards others. Several rounds of rain increased the total amount of marbles in the game. As near-winning groups, they were from inside the basin. Although highly educated, these groups were younger, and less politically experienced than the players of groups 2 and 6.
6.3 A non-win: groups 1 and 3 Sessions 1 and 3 both took place in Sweden in a classroom environment. Group 1 played rather conservatively, whereby players kept their marbles close and were reluctant to share. Most players played to maximize their own profit without consideration for the basin. Not everyone was aware of the background of the co-riparians. Israel lost whilst Jordan gained, but overall the outcome was negative in the long term. The players found it difficult to assess when they should share marbles with others or when to play selfishly. Session 3 took place in Sweden with participants from Middle Eastern studies. It did not result in a win. Specifically, in the first rounds, players were playing selfishly. Thirty minutes into the game, Lebanon and Palestine had all but two marbles left. Regional rain helped them out, but competition for blue marbles remained prevalent. Syria was permanently not willing to lift a state of war with Israel. After 45 minutes, Lebanon suggested having the option for comprehensive regional sharing of marbles among the players. This would mean the lifting of all states of war and reallocation of blue marbles. The initial reaction of both Jordan and Palestine was to hide their transparent boxes of marbles under the table in order to avoid others knowing how many marbles they had. Lebanon persuaded them to share marbles. This improved the game and gradually the group was starting to win. However, drought exacerbated the loss of blue marbles and the group was not able to win within the time left.
Group 1 had little to no knowledge of water management nor of the basin, whilst Group 3 had much more knowledge of the region, but both groups played rather selfishly. This could be explained by the interpretation of the game: the player groups set off on the wrong footing when they thought the game should be played like the boardgame Risk. For Group 3, their knowledge and perception of the behaviour of the co-riparian countries might have played a role in how the players played their respective role in the game.
A clear lose: hydrohegemony in Group 7
The final Session 7 took place in Amman, Jordan with Palestinian Jordanians who had media and water backgrounds, environmentalists, and Jordanians without any background in water issues. Israel was played by a participant who kept consistent in her role as basin bully, which resulted in an extreme asymmetric hydro-hegemony of the basin and no marbles left for Palestine. None of the players felt inclined to any altruistic expressions and therefore the game resulted in a no-win situation and a strong hegemonic position for Israel. The participants' feedback was positive on playing the game, although it did not result in a win, neither environmental suicide. They particularly liked how much it reflected their reality "This game is real. It is so close to what we all experience here in the basin", said one participant. Throughout the game, the players played according to their own perception of the specific riparian country they represented. They played it close to how the players themselves experienced the hydropolitical reality in the basin rather than trying to save the Jordan River together. The player group viewed Israel as a hegemonic superpower: "Nothing stops Israel. They can do whatever they like in this region". This session was very lively and at times emotional, with strong disagreements between the players on how the countries would react and how they should play their respective roles. When the Jordan player tried to change the mood to a more empathic role and convince the Israel player to share marbles and act less selfishly, it was to no avail. The young Jordanian playing Israel was adamant in remaining uncooperative. She played the role of a stubborn riparian who does not want any negotiations or agreement with the other riparians. Palestine remained without water for most of the game, which prompted the Syria player to use it as leverage for a threat of all-out war against Israel. Disagreement emerged between the Israel player and the Palestine player on how Israel would approach the situation. All participants agreed that their identity and perception-ofthe-other greatly determined how they acted and made decisions in the game.
6.5 A shared regional identity and the role of identity constructs Identity issues and perceptions of the other brought to the game by the players greatly influenced how respondents played their roles as the various riparian states. Questions previously posed in this article concerned whether there is the potential to create a shared collective regional identity of the Jordan River Basin and to what extent core and fluid identities play a defining role in decision making on water cooperation. Before answering those two questions, various religious and national identities that can be distinguished are mapped out below to illustrate the complexity of the core identities of people living inside the Jordan River Basin. It is focused on national, ethnic and religious identities as these are considered part of the core construct of identities. The Venn diagram depicted in Fig. 4 is certainly not extensive but shows that core identities of people living inside the basin cross national borders and are historiographically influenced by major fluid religious and national identity spheres outside the Jordan River Basin (for example Iran, Europe, the USA and Russia).
Four co-riparians identify on a national level with being Arab Eastern and one with Israeli Western. With a total of 61 players, our experimental group sessions observed the following core identities from the basin: Messianic Zionists, Israeli Zionists, Israeli seculars, Palestinian Sunni Muslims, Palestinian Seculars, Palestinian Christians, Palestinian Jordanian Sunni Muslims, Jordanian Christians, Jordanian Seculars, Jordanian Sunni Muslims, Druze, Syrian Seculars and Syrian Christians. In the feedback sessions, it was clearly indicated by a majority of participants during the session inside the basin that their identity, previous experiences and perception-of-the-other played a defining role in their decisions on whether to cooperate or not cooperate with other co-riparians. For some of the participants, it was quite difficult to start thinking and acting altruistically at the basin level. One participant described it as follows:
"We cannot be completely objective, we are in the middle of the conflict zone. So my fellow player who plays Lebanon is not talking to Israel, not because he plays Lebanon but because he himself doesn't like Israel. The personal feelings of everyone will have its effects, if you really want to play it in a logical and rational way you should do it with people who don't have any background or experience with the region or any political affiliation. This is one thing that is important. Because our past experience determines how we make decisions and why people cooperate with each other"-Player from the occupied Golan Heights. Religion as core identity was strongest within Group 5. Members of this group identified themselves as Jewish Progressive Religious Zionists. In terms of the peace negotiations with Palestine, they acknowledged that the Israeli occupation is painful for Palestinians and also recognized that the current situation was not environmentally sustainable. Those playing Israel were reluctant to share marbles with other co-riparians. In particular, two players displayed a strong identification with Messianic neo-zionism 6 and were adamant that Hebron, a city at the heart of the religious conflict located in the occupied Palestinian Westbank, formed the epitome of their religious core identity:
"The Holy Sites in the Westbank are of religious importance and represent significant sites for our Jewish identity. They are mentioned in the Torah. Hebron is our foundation. Abraham bought the Cave of The Patriarchs for him and his wife Sarah, so it is rightfully ours as Jews because Abraham is our forefather and our Torah is Truth. Hebron is our ancestral homeland. We are not accepting anything less than full access to the sites and security conditions. (. . ..) God wanted us to own this land. Our prayers are not about worshipping him. We are not worshipping the land or God. This would be idol worship. It is our religious duty to do our prayers and prepare for the Mashiach. We have to develop the land. There is a difference between State of Israel and the Holy Land. This is a matter of compromise and direct negotiations with the Palestinians. But we can't compromise on Hebron. No matter what the UN will say. Hebron is ours. This is our land. The Biblical prescription says that we should rest the land every 7 years. Ultimately of course, the land is owned by God and not us. But God has chosen us to own and develop this land and in particular the cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron. Everything else we can compromise with Palestinians but not on Hebron. This is too important for our Jewish identity and our religion"-Player from Israel.
The JRBBE experiments in this study have established that identity and perception-of-the-other are important factors in decision-making processes of water cooperation. Players from inside the river basin were more influenced by their identities, knowledge and experience in the region than players from outside the basin. This was reflected in the fact that players from outside the region played the game significantly differently than those from inside the basin. What is interesting is that the outcome of the control group of water professionals in Marseille, without any relationship to the region, differed significantly from the two sessions played with university students in Sweden. All three groups are from outside the basin. The two groups in Sweden played the game rather selfishly, whilst the control group played the game overall altruistically. This can be explained by the age and the professional identities of the control group, who possessed more sophisticated knowledge on river basin management than the two student groups in Sweden. The core identities of the players from inside the basin are strongly attached territorially to the Jordan River Basin. For water cooperation at basin level to succeed, it is important to establish trust, empathy and a shared identity between co-riparians that are using the water flows. The identities and worldviews of the players representing the five co-riparians differed considerably, and when core identities are embedded in hostility towards other co-riparians and unresolved past inflicted traumas remain, these identity issues and negative perceptions-of-the-other indeed make sustainable water basin cooperation extremely difficult and inhibit sustainable integrated water resources management.
Conclusion
Using a boardgame methodology, this article investigates the role of identity and perception-of-the-other in water cooperation and management in the Jordan River Basin. The differences in the group outcomes of the JRBBE experiments show that dimensions such as identity and perception-of-the-other are indeed determining factors for players to decide how to cooperate with other co-riparians in the Jordan River Basin. The players inside the basin were clearly more influenced in how they play by their identities and their perception of other co-riparians. The two player groups who clearly won the game had developed a cross-boundary cultural and cosmopolitan professional identity, which contributed to altruistic behaviour for the benefit of the entire basin.
The outcome of the control group and the two clear wins of the group of Syrians in Majdal Shams and the group of Palestinian environmental water professionals in Ramallah indicate that there is a potential for the construction of a cross-boundary shared identity amongst professionals and people outside and across the basin. There seems to be a fluid transboundary cosmopolitan technocratic identity widely shared by those inside and outside the region who are highly educated. This is a positive outcome for the potential of environmental peacebuilding. It also begs the question whether the level of education is conducive to successful water cooperation; this can be a topic for further research.
The goal of identifying identity and cognitive dimensions of water cooperation has to come to a situation where people can play a role with a more positive rather than negative impact on the hydrological cycle in a river basin. In order to do that, people in the basin should behave more altruistically and empathically towards each other rather than acting selfishly or resorting to violence. Our game experiments showed that if players play purely selfishly and for their own gain and interest, the outcome is an extremely hydrohegemonic situation with inequitable distribution of water resources amongst co-riparians that is detrimental for the basin. When players play more empathically and altruistically towards other co-riparians, the outcome is an optimal allocation based on equitable distribution of water resources. Ultimately, in the long term, altruism at basin level is in the self-interest of all co-riparians and their next generations at national level. Considering the identified challenges, how far is it feasible to establish effective and equitable hydropeace in the Jordan River Basin? Identity issues leading to violence make water cooperation in the Jordan River Basin difficult and challenging. As Albert Einstein once said: "It is a sad age when it is more difficult to break a prejudice than an atom." Within the IWRM paradigm, peace will not emerge in a solely technocratic domain and a managerial focus on rational choice that does not consider and take into account the role of identity, perception-of-the-other and transformation of conflict as a prerequisite for success.
